



## Safety analysis and verification/validation of MachIne LEarning-based systems

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
**RISE ICT, Viktoria**

# Machine Learning in vehicles

- Why machine learning is necessary to enable autonomous driving
  - Traditional, rule-based, methods are static
  - Neural networks have the ability to generalize
- Trends that make Machine Learning possible in vehicles
  - Deep learning improves performance compared to traditional neural networks
  - Computational power for training and executing deep learning networks

# Machine Learning – Neural Networks

- Neural Networks learns the desired behaviour from historical data
- We want the networks to generalize
  - The network should be able to take decisions on previously unknown data – if it is similar to the training data
- How do we avoid taking decisions on data that is not similar to training data?



$x$   
“panda”  
57.7% confidence

+ .007 ×

$\text{sign}(\nabla_x J(\theta, x, y))$   
“nematode”  
8.2% confidence


=

$x + \epsilon \text{sign}(\nabla_x J(\theta, x, y))$   
“gibbon”  
99.3 % confidence

# Why deep technologies?

- Polynomial expressed with shared components: advantage of depth may grow exponentially

- Deep structures can make context mapping
- Deep Learning and deep knowledge



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## Existing knowledge

United Airlines' shares fell 8 percent yesterday, but rebounded by mid-day today.

United Airlines suffered from bad publicity due to mistreatment of passengers.

Ford' shares lost 3% because of the bad publicity caused by recent recalls.

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## New knowledge

United Airlines' shares fell 8 percent (possibly) because of the bad publicity

# Neural Networks for perception

- To define the role of the NN it is important to have clear understanding about:
  - What role should the driver have?
  - What role should the system have?
  - Operational Design Domain ODD – the specific situations where a system is designed to operate in, e.g. a motorway or a geographical area.
- Local perception and awareness is key for AD
- Training NN to recognize hazardous situations
- Training NN to anticipate unforeseen situations

# ML impacts on ISO 26262

- Five areas
  - Identifying hazards
  - Faults and failure modes
  - The use of training set
  - Level of ML usage
  - Required software techniques
- Hazard: "a potential source of harm caused by malfunctioning behaviour of the item where harm is physically injury or damage to the health of persons"

An Analysis of ISO 26262: Using Machine Learning Safely in Automotive Software. Rick Saly, Rodrigo Queiroz, Krysztof Czarnecki. arXiv: 1709.02435v1

# ML impacts on ISO 26262

- Identifying hazards
  - Automation takes over more and more control.
  - Taking over becomes increasingly critical.
  - Increased automation can/will create behaviour change in the operator → reducing their skill level.
  - Include harm potentially caused by complex behaviour interaction between human and vehicle.
- Faults and failure modes
  - Incorrect output for a given input.
  - Current recommendations apply.
- The use of training set
  - Necessary to use ML for perception. A training set is used instead of a specification.
  - Data does not contain all possible scenarios.
  - Design systems that can cope with an error rate.
- Level of ML usage
  - End-to-End systems model all functionality and the result is a complex black box system.
  - Use ML at the component level.
- Required software techniques
  - ISO 26262 requires many specific techniques for software development.
  - Some apply to ML, some may be adapted but some others assume programming.
  - Express requirement in terms of intent and maturity of the techniques rather than their specific details.

# What is SMILE II about?

- We accept that DNN are black-boxes and that we need to include them in vehicle perception
- Camera-based perception models
- Investigate pre-training
  - Humans learn from birth what is “dangerous”
  - Can self driving vehicles make use of other contexts?
- Investigate how to handle model updates
- Demonstrate perception use-case







# What is SMILE II about?

- Safety Cage to monitor the data presented to the network

SMILE focus initially on  
Input data analysis



# Image anomaly detection using convolutional autoencoders




Work by: Lars Tornberg, VCC

# Data set

MNIST data set:

- 70 000 images (28x28)




Omniglot data set:

- 1623 images (105x105)
- 50 different alphabets
- 20 examples per char

# Data preparation

Resize omniglot images to MNIST size (105x105 -> 28x28):





Nearest neighbour interpolation



Bilinear interpolation






# Convolutional Autoencoder



Framework: Keras  
Loss: Pixel by pixel MSE  
Training set: MNIST 46900 examples (67%)

# Method evaluation

## Burmese (Myanmar), NN-interpolation






$$\text{Precision} = \frac{tp}{tp + fp}$$

$$\text{Recall} = \frac{tp}{tp + fn}$$

# Method evaluation

## Futurama, NN-interpolation





$$\text{Precision} = \frac{tp}{tp + fp}$$

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
# Method evaluation

Burmese (Myanmar), bilinear-interpolation



$$\text{Precision} = \frac{tp}{tp + fp}$$



$$\text{Recall} = \frac{tp}{tp + fn}$$






# Method evaluation

## Futurama, bilinear-interpolation



$$\text{Precision} = \frac{tp}{tp + fp}$$

$$\text{Recall} = \frac{tp}{tp + fn}$$



# Results and conclusion so far

- It is important to understand the input space
  - What data should the network be allowed to process?
  - How should the data be pre-processed?
- Understand what is unique in the images
  - How different from the training data is ok?
- Developing the safety-cage using “simple” datasets can prove soundness of the method, but must also be thoroughly evaluated in the final domain.
  - How is difference estimated in high dimensional space?
- Publications
  - Henriksson, J., Borg, M., Englund, C.: **Automotive safety and machine learning: Initial results from a study on how to adapt the ISO 26262 safety standard**. In: SEFAIAS-2018. (2018)
  - Borg, M., Englund, C., Duran, B.: **Traceability and Deep Learning - Safety-critical Systems with Traces Ending in Deep Neural Networks**. In: In Proc. of the Grand Challenges of Traceability: The Next Ten Years. (2017) 48–49
  - Englund, Cristofer; Borg, Markus; Duran, Boris; Kaijser, Henrik ; Lönn, Henrik; Lindström, Konstantin; Zandén, Carl; Levandowski, Christoffer; Simoen, Michaël; Törnquist, Jonas. **Deep Learning and Safety-critical Systems: Research, Practice, and Future Needs in Automotive**. In review IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems



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